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Did Eastern enlargement increase the cultural diversity of the EU?

Identity, religion, communication, and governance cultures in European integration theory

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Abstract: The accession of eight Central European states in 2004 did not only bring economic, but also additional cultural diversity to the EU. It has been argued that this growing cultural heterogeneity impedes further integration due to the growing number of contradicting value systems which politicians in the multi-level system have to respond to. The proposed contribution aims at putting that view into perspective by differentiating between different sets of cultural factors. On the macro-level, cultural variables like religious adherence or language competency do not seem to show a significant growth of variety that goes back to enlargement. However, some cultural factors like identity, societal spiritualism, social communication potential and governance culture matter not to the character of European integration as a whole, but to certain aspects of European integration theory. While the new member states fit into a generally heterogeneous cultural landscape of Europe, their communist past matters for a specific governance culture that might work against further steps of deepening integration.

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1. Introduction

Arguably, the negligence of cultural factors in integration theory could be justified until recently by the cultural homogeneity of the EU and its focus on technical market-building. With the successive accession rounds to the EC/EU and the debate on including further countries like Turkey or Ukraine into the EU, the question of cultural diversity within the Union has however gained more relevance. In public and scientific debates, the existence of a European identity on a varying set of cultural determinants has been widely discussed (e.g. see Green 2000; Triandafyllidou/Spohn 2002; Joas/Wiegandt 2005).

The debate on the cultural grounds of European integration turns around three questions: a) which notion or concept of culture is fruitful for the further study of European integration, b) to what extent may one or another concept back the diagnosis of growing cultural diversity within the European Union, and – if the diagnosis is correct – c) to what aspects of European integration is cultural diversity an impediment? All three questions are addressed in the paper. While there is no overarching finding in the sense that one or the other element of culture has determinately influenced

European integration as a whole, hypotheses are formulated with regard to four cultural factors. First, the differences which can be found in the identification to Europe hint at affinities between certain types of national identities and types of European ideas. Second, spiritually oriented member states tend to support positive integration steps, whereas a combination of protestant and non-spiritual societies seems to favour negative integration. Third, the lower readiness of big member state individuals to engage in social communication with people from other member states may be linked to a tendency of national (and not European, or transnational) responsiveness of their elites. And fourth, defects in the democratic quality of European governance cultures work against further integration steps. The findings, which are gathered through the construction of indices pointing at specific locations of European integration theory, are discussed one by one in section 3. They are followed by a conclusion. The now following section 2 discusses the relevance of different (and competing) concepts of culture for European integration theory.

2. Concepts of culture and the study of European integration

The study of European integration is related to culture mainly in two areas (Hölscher 2006: 12). First, the cultural traditions of the EU nation states and (sometimes) their regions are relevant in the compromise machinery of EU decision-making. While the insight is obvious and has fostered a number of edited volumes analyzing the different national backgrounds of EU action (e.g. Zeff/Pirro 2001; Weidenfeld 2004), the conceptualization of these cultural traditions remains contested. Whereas some authors tend to include a wide set of variables – the political system, citizen orientations, religious traditions, and so on – into their understanding of a cultural tradition, others insist on more rigorous and less inclusive concepts.

Second, the question of a European identity has been addressed with growing tendency. The longer European integration went on, the less exclusive became the initial binding elements of European integration – preventing a new war in Europe and creating a zone of economic prosperity. Rather, with the integration in the 2nd and 3rd pillar of the EU the classic elements of stateness like citizenship or the monopoly of internal and external power started to erode. Without a genuine European state taking the role of the EU nation states, a European identity as the foundation of legitimate government has been widely discussed (e.g. Risse 2001; Kastoryano 2005; several articles in Schuppert/Pernice/Haltern 2005).

There are at least three competing schools of thought designing (politically relevant) cultural traditions as something less than the entire political system of a given polity.[1] The first to be named is linked to the *cultural turn* which touched political science to a much lesser extent than most other social sciences. Its roots are on the traditional line of cultural studies which go back to the *Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies* at the University of Birmingham. They focus on the critical refurbishment of public

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[1] In part, the following section draws on Beichelt (2004b: 151-153).

discourse and discuss how popular culture is able to influence political decisions and political developments (Bromley/Göttlich/Winter 1999).[2] A whole "cultural theory of political science", building on previous work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas, has been established to create a link between different forms of societal solidarity which in turn form preferences as the basis of societal organization (Thompson/Grendstad/Selle 1999). Further research in this tradition deals critically with the role of mass media in modern democracies (Meyer 2001) and has inspired empiric analyses on the different media systems in EU member states and the way these shape the political action of the respective national politicians in Brussels, Strasbourg, and elsewhere.

A second approach is related to political sciences after the cultural turn, but focuses primarily on symbols of political culture (and less on the critical reflection on those persons reflecting these symbols). One author has accordingly called it the "symbol-oriented approach" of political culture (Schwelling 2001). Unlike in the classic tradition of Almond/Verba (1963), political culture is seen here as a grammar structure (Dittmer 1977) or a general image of the political in the world (Rohe 1994). Symbols are therefore the main focal point of mutual understanding. There exist obvious symbols like flags or national anthems, but also other elements may evolve into the status of symbols. For example, the European draft constitution constitutes not only a legal text, but also a web of symbolic meanings around the European citizen or the design of political leadership in Europe. Therefore, the semiotic content of symbols in different regional or national contexts remains a relevant object of scientific research. If we bear in mind that only a few generations ago many of today's EU member states were engaged in hostile relations, it becomes clear that notably state related symbols should be expected to be interpreted differently in the grammar structure of the European polity. Accordingly, the study of European political cultures has become much more contingent: ethnic appreciations and national identifications determine factors like the support of democracy (e.g. Westle 1999) which in the classic approach are seen as universally – and not contingently – valid variables of political culture.

A third approach explicitly designing cultural factors of European political life can be found in comparative politics. When Francis G. Castles categorized different "families of nations", he presumed that cultural attributes of (national) societies influence political outputs and outcomes to a large extent. Whole public policies are therefore to be interpreted within the cultural context(s) of the decision-making systems (Castles 1993). A similar approach has been taken in some areas of transition studies. When it became clear in the 1990s that a naïve design of political and market institutions did not suffice to reach the consolidation of post-socialist systems, even the most convinced market liberals started looking for the cultural preconditions for democracy and capitalism (Harrison/Huntington 2000; see especially Sachs 2000). Some political scientists even argued that the whole variance of political and economic transition may be explained by "culture" (Lipset 1992; Landes 2000).

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[2] The cited volume contains basic texts of cultural studies in German translation, for example by Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, Edward Thompson, and Stuart Hall.

In these three approaches, the explanatory potential of culture is conceptualized in completely different ways. The envoys of culturalist political science do not design culture as a variable among others. Rather, culture constitutes the context within which all societal (including political) life takes place. In this line of thought, culture may not analytically be divided from social reality; it therefore cannot be singled out for explanatory reasons. Since any political theory – also the one on European integration – aims at explaining one or the other element of political facts (Sabine 1968: V), culturalist concepts of culture are not able to contribute much to the theoretic discussion of European integration. That does not mean that they do not bear any virtue at all. However, their strengths are better visible in complex, thickly described, and case-oriented settings where variable-oriented approaches are not sufficient to fully understand political developments on the European stage.

The symbol oriented approach seems better suited to fit into European integration theory. A direct debate on European symbols seems to be more located in the sphere of political actors than in academia. The repeated promotion of genuinely European symbols – e.g. the anthem, the flag, and the Europe day – hints at a mind map of European political actors that certain common elements of reference help to build up a European identity. One of the clearest examples is the introduction of the common currency. Whereas its introduction was accompanied by fierce discussions on potential chances and risks, the symbolic side was widely perceived positive and helped realizing the project to a large extent. For example, the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl never left out an opportunity to attribute the introduction of the Euro to the "destiny" of the people in Europe; also he used the idea of a European "identity building" as a consequence of the common currency.[3] The draft for the Constitution of Europe is another area where a material, at first sight non-symbolic element is seen as promoting a European identity (Grimm 2004).

Although there exists no explicit literature on the contribution of symbols to European integration theory, the debate on a European identity is therefore closely linked to symbols. The approach therefore leads directly into the conceptualizations of national or European identities. Especially the political culture literature has developed several measures for a European identity; the best known probably in the regular Eurobarometer surveys. Some empiric results will be presented in the following chapter.

The third approach is compatible with European integration theory as well. As outlined above, its methodology consists in including cultural, or "soft", variables into explanatory designs. In this context, two possibilities exist. First, cultural variables may deem useful for phenomena which have not been fully explained by designs disregarding these factors. For example, the liberal governmentalist approach of European integration theory (Moravcsik 1998) is arguably rather weak in explaining *when* – in which historic situation – national governments are ready to give up elements of sovereignty. Again arguably, not only the incentives of the Common Market pushed European political actors for successively ceding sovereignty. An addi-

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[3] For example, see Helmut Kohl's Bundestag speech on the date of decision for the Euro on April 23, 1998 (http://www.unser-parlament.de/download/SHOW/reden_und_dokumente/).

tional explanatory power goes to the growing interlinkage of European societies and their cross-cultural interactions which prepared the background for the acceptance of European integration both among elites and voters in EC/EU member states.

A second way of increasing the explanatory power of culture consists in identifying variables that are able to elucidate certain aspects of European integration. It is a somewhat grubby procedure to have a variable, or rather a set of variables, seek their own subjects of theoretic relevance. However, it is not new for theoretic debates of European integration. Because of its *sui generis* character, the theoretic consideration of European integration has always been explorative. Four "locations" of European integration theory have been identified (Rosamond 2000: 14-16). Accordingly, European integration theory is able to tell us things about a) other international organizations, b) other regional aggregations, c) policy-making in a multi-level context and d) historically rooted ex-post explanations of the integration process itself. With other words, European integration theory takes multi-faceted shapes, and accordingly the following section bears an explorative rather than a systematic character.

3. An attempt: some cultural variables and European integration theory

Culture as an element deemed relevant for the study of European integration has only evolved in recent years as a consequence of external and internal developments. Domestically, the European constitution as a whole, but particularly the wording of its preamble have challenged both supporters and adversaries of debating the homogeneity of European societies (from different angles, see Metz 2003; Kleger 2004; Moravcsik 2006). One of the questions most fiercely discussed went on the mentioning of Christianity as the main religious inheritance of Europe; with implications for atheists and other religious communities actually living in Europe. Externally, the discussions on the cultural traditions of Europe were fuelled by the Turkish request to start admission negotiations which coincided with the constitutional debate. Not only the EU membership of a Muslim country, but more general the internal coherence of the newly enlarged European Union appeared as the central topic of discourse (Kramer 2003; Griffiths/Özdemir 2004; Leggewie 2004).

More in general then, the value of culture as an element of European integration theory then seems to lie in its relevance beyond academic debates. Since there does not exist a pertinent theoretic debate to potentially structure my discussion, I will now follow the issues of the approaches mentioned above in a rather loose order and come back to the question of the systematic value of cultural variables afterwards. In the following tables, the new member states of the 2004 accession period will be marked by italic letters, as the following section 4 deals with the question to what extent Eastern enlargement has contributed to the perceived growth of cultural diversity within the EU.

3.1. European identity: constructing national identities in context

In philosophy and mathematics, the term identity stands for sameness between two objects. When the term applies to groups, however, social identities establishing a difference between ingroups and outgroups become important. Classic positions distinguish the self from society, focusing on the mechanisms that detach and link the individual from society (Mead 1936). More recent approaches, however, highlight the existence of various layers, or levels, of the self (Haslam 2001). This means that individuals are capable of identifying with various group entities, for example with nations and other social groups.

Consequently, discussing the idea of a European identity is an endeavour into a relative self-attribution of individuals to Europe. In Europe, the main focus of political identification has been the nation state, albeit with different nation state models and different intensities (Brubaker 1992; Greenfeld 1992). Some, especially the long existing nation states of Europe with (nowadays) uncontested peoples and borders, have managed to create strong links between its citizens and the state as a symbol. Other nation states are in less comfortable conditions. Notably in Central Europe, six of the eight new EU member states have not existed on geographic maps before 1989.[4] The identities of these states is therefore much more rooted in cultural, or even ethnic, categories than in attributes that are linked to the political aspects of citizenship.[5] Additionally, the ethnic composition of most Central European nation states is heterogeneous, partly within the territorial borders of the (mostly new) nations, but partly also with a sense of belonging from people living outside of their ethnic or cultural homelands (see Brubaker 1997).[6]

People in all European nation states, however, have experienced additional layers to their respective national identities. Despite the relative sealing-off of the socialist states, in Europe there have not existed completely closed-up nations like, for example, North Korea. Some European nation states have traditionally had particularly open borders, not only for goods and trade but also for the movement of people. The Benelux countries with their Economic Union of 1948 are obvious examples. Others, and again the formerly post-socialist countries of Central Europe including East Germany are pertinent, have experienced periods of insularity both in societal and economic interaction.

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[4] Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

[5] That does not mean that – neither in Central Europe nor with regard to other places – identity should conceptually be merged with concepts of culture (Orchard 2002). Both notions relate to each other, but identity can refer to other elements than culture, and culture has more dimensions than only identity.

[6] For example: Hungarians living in Slovakia or Romania, Russians in the Baltic States.

Tabelle 1: Identification of EU citizens with Europe vis-à-vis the nation state (in, in rank, 2003).

	Identification with Europe*	Identification with nation state**	Index of European identification (A – B)
Luxemburg	**69 (1)**	21 (25)	48
Italy	**67 (3)**	26 (22)	41
Slovakia	**62 (5)**	25 (23)	37
France	**68 (2)**	34 (15)	34
Spain	**65 (4)**	34 (15)	31
Malta	**61 (6)**	30 (21)	31
Germany	**60 (7)**	34 (15)	26
Slovenia	**57 (9)**	32 (18)	25
Cyprus	48 (18)	25 (23)	23
Poland	**54 (11)**	32 (18)	22
Latvia	**52 (13)**	31 (20)	21
Denmark	**56 (10)**	37 (12)	19
Belgium	**59 (8)**	45 (9)	14
Czech Republic	49 (16)	37 (12)	12
Estonia	50 (14)	39 (10)	11
Lithuania	41 (21)	35 (14)	6
Portugal	**53 (12)**	49 (6)	4
Netherlands	50 (14)	46 (8)	4
Ireland	49 (16)	48 (7)	1
Hungary	37 (24)	39 (10)	-2
Austria	47 (19)	**51 (5)**	-4
Greece	44 (20)	**53 (4)**	-9
Sweden	41 (21)	**55 (3)**	-14
Finland	40 (23)	**56 (2)**	-16
United Kingdom	35 (25)	**64 (1)**	-29

* Part of respondents (in) that identifies "exclusively" or "partly" with Europe.

** Part of respondents that identifies "exclusively" with own nation.

Source: Eurobarometer EB 59 and CC-EB 2003.2 (both 2003).

It seems that these factors play a certain role in determining the identification of EU citizens to either their nation states or the European Union itself (see table 1). At first sight, the approximately inverse relationship of European and nation state identities in many member states seems to hint to the modern vision of undivided political identities: Although societies bear a heterogeneous structure, certain groups within these societies seem to identify with either one or the other political entity. The second sight, however, reveals a broad range of double identities, however. The table shows that multiple identities characterize the populations of EU member states and reveals that between one third and two thirds from most populations identify with either Europe or the nation state which means that national group identities are dispersed and overlapping to a considerable extent.

Two factors are correlated with strong identification ratios to the nation state. First, all countries whose citizens identify with their nation states with absolute majorities

have entered European structures at a later stage. Austria, Sweden, and Finland have not been in the Union for more than ten years, and political actors both in Great Britain (EU member since 1973) and Greece (1981) have from the beginning of their membership cultivated an image of distance to important elements of European integration (Markou/Nakos/Zahariadis 2001; Rasmussen 2001). Second, geographic remoteness to the Centre of Europe seems to be linked to the preference of nation state identification to Europe, for example in Finland, Sweden, Hungary, or Greece. The Centre of Europe here is characterised in economic terms by the existence of two force fields, one ranging from Northern Italy through Western Germany, Eastern France and the Benelux states to Southern England, and the other from Northern Italy along the southern Mediterranean to South Western Spain (Krätke 2006: 207). Integration theory tells us that the strong economic interaction taking place between these regions leads to a general increase in social communication which in turn forms the foundation for further integration, mutual awareness, and geographically enlarged empathy (Deutsch 1953). Seen in this light, it is no surprise that relatively few Italians, French, Spaniards and Germans identify *exclusively* with their respective nation states. At the same time, relatively large proportions of these populations have found additional elements of identification in Europe.

The new member states show a heterogeneous picture. Some of the new states, like Slovakia, Slovenia, or Poland, fit in the Europeanized picture of most EU founding states. However, also Malta figures in this group despite its remoteness to the European mainland. Others, like Lithuania, and Hungary, are characterized by comparatively low levels of identification to both the nation state and Europe. After several decades of authoritarian rule, the affirmative attribution to any political authority seems to be hindered by political apathy.

It has been argued that a combination of three elements helps explain the build-up of a European identity (Risse 2001). First, potential identity constructions differing from or altering the image of the nation-state need to have a chance to be considered as legitimate. Second, "instrumental interests then select the successful ones among the available identity constructions" (ibid.). And third, socialization processes then consolidate the double selection process. If we follow the heuristic model, the initial acceptance of a European identity depends on its attractiveness to individuals and groups that are attached to the nation state. Thomas Risse also mentioned the relevance of various different ideational constructions about the nation state, Europe, and their intersection. For example, Charles de Gaulle's *Europe de Nations*, the Transatlanticists' view of the *Community of Western values*, the socialist or social-democratic *Third way* between communism and capitalism, and the *Christian Europe* have been distilled from national and transnational discourses (ibid.: 203-204).

This thought model puts the data from table 1 into a dispersed light. Risse hints at possible compatibilities between types of national identities and types of European ideas. For example, the relatively closed French national model did go along well with a conception of a Europe of nations as prosecuted by de Gaulle. However, the exceptionally high openness of social interaction in those regions of France with the highest economic output outdated that model over the years (see Schmidt 2002). Consequently, the French elites worked on a model that transposed French ambitions in Europe to a "powerful" *Europe puissante* (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2005).

Despite serious incompatibilities of that model with reality, the strategy worked in the sense that the national identification of parts of the population has been transformed into a European one. Germany, as another example, for a long time came along well with the idea of market creation because it fitted Germany's economic structure well in times of domestic growth. The economic crisis of the more recent years, however, has also highlighted the negative consequences for some society segments, which led to significantly lower support and identification with Europe (Hrbek 2002: 112). Austria, as the last example, entered the EU with strong elements of identification compared to the other countries of its enlargement group. A few years later, the national self-image linked to neutrality and self-determination was shocked by the EU boycott due to the Freedom Party government participation (Angerer 2003). The weak level of European identification as shown in table 1 is therefore no surprise.

In general, processes of European identification building seem less likely in smaller countries because their potential impact within the EU is more limited. The Index of European identification (again, see table 1) is positive in all big or medium size EU member states (with the exception of Great Britain) whereas is gets close to zero or negative only in small member states. On the other hand, in some countries with a rather weak feeling of belonging to a nation, like Slovakia or Slovenia, even after a short time of EU membership rather large proportions of the populations have attached EU membership to the wider Western value system (Laitin 2002) and therefore perform strongly into the direction of European identification.

Further research on European identity in the enlarged EU will therefore have to draw on the relevance of the construction of both national and European identity figures; it is not exclusively one or the other dimension but their compatibility which provides us with insights on the intensity of European identity in the EU member states.

3.2. Religion, spiritualism, and the thrive for negative integration

About every introductory text on the relation between religion and the political contains the information that remains contested between different schools of thoughts (Minkenberg/Willems 2002; Gebhardt/Schmid n.a.). No undisputed theoretic position on the relevance of religion to European integration can then be expected. In fact, a direct discussion on the religion's general impact is lacking in European integration theory. Rather, positions have to be derived from related fields.

One of them consists in religiously oriented political parties. Christian democracy in Western Europe has to a certain extent managed to combine the aims of preserving certain cultural institutions like the traditional family or a moderate participation of the catholic church in public life (see Hanley 1996). Since the main program of the first decades of European integration consisted in building an economic zone that provided for political and economic freedom within but at the same time for external protection, major aims of religiously inspired actors were compatible with the broad direction of integration. The further dimension of mutual understanding between

formerly hostile populations was an additional factor. Hence, notably the European People's Party faction in the European Parliament has generally opted for supporting further integration despite the imminent threats of (socio-economic as well as socio-cultural) transnationalism for traditional communities and institutions (Hanley 2002).

Another example of indirect theorizing can be found in the linkage between transition and modernization processes in Central Europe and the simultaneous Europeanization of that region. Mainly for the case of Poland, the catholic church has been identified as an ambivalent factor European integration. On the one hand, the official clergy in the end supports integration despite the perceived threat of Western individualism that undermines faithful ways of living with regard to living styles (Byrnes 2001; Marcinkowski 2002). On the other hand, notably the strictly clerical radio station Radio Maryja is a major force in agitating against European integration and some of its underlying value principles (Gluchowski 1999). The theoretic argument behind the linkage of transition societies and European integration consists in the ambivalent consequences of modernism that threaten certain societal groups and institutions more than others (Pollack 2002). In rural areas and among the less educated, the simultaneous transition of the political and economic regimes demands more severe adaptation measures than among the well-educated in urban regions. Hence, political opposition against modernization is rather likely to align to conservative clerical forces leaning against the menace of speedy socio-cultural and socio-economic liberalization.

Again in Poland, the Catholic Church enjoys a strong support in society due to its status as a national symbol having integrated Polish societies during the centuries of occupation and foreign rule. Even if forces in the political centre do not share all conservative positions of the clergy or the more radical elements (see Stankiewicz 2002), they have to be aware of the considerable vibrancy these actors meet in Polish society. The fierce fight of the Polish government for including a reference to God into the preamble of the Constitution for Europe is the best, but by far not the only example (again, see Marcinkowski 2002). During the admission negotiations, it was not a conservative but a post-communist Polish government that opposed the majority of European government wanting to keep the preamble open for secular and non-Christian interpretations. The government was backed by another post-communist player, President Kwaśniewski. The even fiercer fight of the new government and president for including a reference to Christianity is therefore easy to explain when taking into account the literature of electoral positions going back to Downs (1957). What counts here is not so much the position of including an ideological element into a preamble that in the end matters little for the European Union's political programs. Rather, the symbolic status of the Polish Catholic Church guarantees a central position not only in the spiritual, but in the civil sense of religion. The Polish Catholic Church has gained the symbolic status as a provider of "civil religion" (Bellah 1967), a "is a public perception of […] national experience […]: a set of values, symbols, and rituals institutionalized as the cohesive force and center of meaning uniting […]" the Polish people (Novak 1974: 127).

The elements discussed go along with two theoretic lines of including culture into the theory of European integration discussed in section 2. The value of Christianity as a symbol of national unity in a context of competing and historically hostile foreign

powers is one example for the symbol oriented approach discussed in section 2. Embedding religion into modernization as well as party politics theory is an example of the heuristic inclusion of "cultural" variables into explanations for the progress of European integration.

Table 2: Religious affiliation in EU member states

Catholic	Protestant	Orthodox	No majority of one religious group
Austria (73) Belgium (81) France (81) *Hungary (66)* Ireland (88) Italy (90) *Lithuania (78)* Luxembourg (95) *Malta (XXX)* *Poland (96)* Portugal (90) *Slovakia (69)* *Slovenia (70)* Spain (94)	Denmark (90) *Estonia (n.a.)* Finland (85) Great Britain (72) *Latvia (55)* Sweden (85)	*Bulgaria (86)* *Cyprus (80)* Greece (97) *Romania (87)*	*Czech Republic (69 without confession, 27 cath.)* Germany (33 cath., 33 prot.) Netherlands (36 cath., 26 prot.)

Source: Fischer Weltalmanach (2003).

The major basis for this kind of heuristic explanations is, of course, empiric evidence on the distribution of religious variables in Europe. First and foremost, the European Union is marked by a variance of the three big religious confessions, Catholicism, Protestantism in various specifications, and Orthodoxy. In general, most EU countries are dominated by one of the Christian confessions; only the Czech Republic, Germany and the Netherlands are characterized by the opposite. The Czech writer and former President Václav Havel once characterized modernity as the first atheist civilization in world history (Havel 1987: 18). He certainly had in mind Czech (or rather: Czechoslovak) society, where atheism is greatest in Europe with 69% of the population living without a confession. The value is not matched by other European States, however. Notably in Poland and along the Mediterranean, 80% and more confess themselves to their (catholic and orthodox) churches (see table 2).

Havel's argument did not aim at pure church affiliation, however. His position identified the position of human nature in the modern world as apart from moral and spiritual convictions, in an over-orientation towards secular phenomena like commerce, mediatisation, and technicism.[7] The position is relevant because of the inherent logic of market creation in the European Union, which does not only lead to modernization processes, but in the EU is flanked by a lack of political institutions to encounter the social effects of market failure: European integration is marked by

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[7] Interestingly, the current Pope Benedict XVI. has argued similarly in a treatise on the moral state of Europe (Ratzinger 1991).

massive negative integration and comparatively little positive (institution building) integration (Tinbergen 1965; Scharpf 1999).

Table 3: Spiritual belief in EU member states (in)

	Index of spiritual belief (A x B / 100)			Index of spiritual non-belief (C x D / 100)		
	I do believe there is a god (A)	I do think about the meaning and purpose of life "often" (B)	**Index**	I do not believe there is a god (C)	I do think about the meaning and purpose of life "rarely"/"never" (D)	**Index**
Cyprus	*90*	*69*	***62.1***	*2*	*8*	***0.2***
Malta	*95*	*52*	***49.4***	*1*	*13*	***0.1***
Greece	81	56	**45.4**	3	16	**0.5**
Poland	*80*	*41*	***32.8***	*1*	*20*	***0.2***
Portugal	81	32	**25.9**	6	16	**1.0**
Lithuania	*49*	*52*	***25.5***	*12*	*11*	***1.3***
Italy	74	34	**25.2**	6	25	**1.5**
Ireland	73	34	**24.8**	4	30	**1.2**
Slovakia	*61*	*35*	***21.4***	*11*	*25*	***2.8***
Luxemburg	44	47	**20.7**	22	21	**4.6**
Spain	59	34	**20.1**	18	25	**4.5**
Latvia	*37*	*47*	***17.4***	*10*	*14*	***1.4***
Finland	41	39	**16.0**	16	17	**2.7**
Germany	47	34	**16.0**	25	29	**7.3**
Belgium	43	37	**15.9**	27	25	**6.8**
Austria	54	26	**14.0**	8	31	**2.5**
Netherlands	34	41	**13.9**	27	21	**5.7**
Slovenia	*37*	*36*	***13.3***	*16*	*19*	***3.0***
Denmark	31	40	**12.4**	19	20	**3.8**
UK	38	32	**12.2**	20	31	**6.2**
Hungary	*44*	*27*	***11.9***	*19*	*37*	***7.0***
France	34	34	**11.6**	33	27	**8.9**
Sweden	23	30	**6.9**	23	25	**5.8**
Estonia	*16*	*37*	***5.9***	*26*	*22*	***5.7***
Czech R.	*19*	*29*	***5.5***	*30*	*30*	***9.0***
Average EU	52	35	**18.2**	18	26	**4.7**

Source: Special Eurobarometer 225 (2005); Q1, Q2.[8]

Now, societies with large proportions of non-spirituality, seem more ready to accept this radical kind of market creation which offers both opportunities and dangers of societal cohesion. Within data from the Eurobarometer, spiritual belief as a variable may be constructed by two indicators. First, the belief in god stands for (mostly) Christian belief. The indicator varies from the socio-structural information on religious affiliation to a considerable extent. For example, whereas 90% of the Italian

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[8] To be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_251_en.pdf.

population belongs to the catholic church, only 74% actually confirm a belief in god. Similar findings relate to Ireland, Spain or even Poland. Second, however, Havel's diagnosis of a secular European civilization reminds us that spiritual beliefs may not explicitly be directed to a (mostly) Christian belief. Therefore, I use reflection on the meaning and purpose of life as an additional indicator not relating to a religious confession (see table 3). If we combine both indicators, we see that catholic and orthodox societies dispose of a significantly higher potential to contain spiritual belief as an element of individual and therefore social lives. In the highest ranking protestant country, Finland, a statistic number of 16% of the population is spiritually oriented with a combination of 41% believing in god and 39% regularly reflecting on the purpose and meaning of life.

Theoretically, low levels of spiritual belief are not linked to European integration in general, but to a specific part. Strives for individualisation and non-spiritual self-realisation are in need of a liberal, or liberalised, societal structure in socio-economic and socio-cultural terms. While the usefulness of positive integration may not be categorically questioned, it is rated secondary to the utility of negative integration which enhances individual opportunities and at the same time enables the economic wealth gains needed to make use of the new degrees of freedom. The theoretic assumption is backed by the empiric evidence quite well. With some exceptions – or rather: not completely clear cases like France (Schmidt 2002) – low values on the index of spiritual belief are correlated to those countries that traditionally stand for market creation and are sceptic to positive integration. Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom: all member states with opt-outs from the European treaties are positioned towards the end of the scale. Those new member states voicing the loudest scepticism to trim market forces in the EU, Estonia and the Czech Republic, have the lowest index values. Therefore, it seems fair to state a theoretic link between the spiritual affinity of a people, the responsiveness of their leaders to the principles following from spiritualism and non-spiritualism, and the positions voiced by the political leaders of the respective countries.

3.3. Social communication and mutual understanding: languages and contacts

In his theory of social communication, Karl Deutsch (1953) attributed the development of an integrated social space to the amount of communication between the members of the integrating societies. Deutsch used his argument for a variety of integration processes. One example was the development of the German railways system in the second half of the 19th century necessitated a common time zone in a region previously marked by the weak cohesion of a late or even "delayed nation" (Plessner 1992). Another instance used by Deutsch was the Transatlantic Alliance after World War II which existed not only as an International Organization, but due to shared values and social interaction figured as a "security community". Deutsch envisaged an analogous development for the integration of Western Europe, not least as a counter-reaction to primarily hostile policies from the Soviet space (Deutsch 1992).

In Deutsch's thinking, social communication is therefore not limited to acts of speaking. On the other hand, when thinking of a possible criteria for measuring levels of social communication, mutual understanding in lingual terms seems central. With its focus on the negotiation machinery not only in Brussels, but in all networks related to European governance, the command of foreign languages is a key element of social communication in Europe.

Empirically, exactly half of the population in the EU-25 is able to participate in a conversation in another language than their mother tongue.[9] Reading newspapers or magazines in foreign languages is one element to help building up a European discourse space, as has happened around the article by Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas on the common ground of European politics in 2003 (Derrida/Habermas 2003); the article has been published in widely read newspapers in French and German on the same day. In order to prepare the grounds for further trans-European discourse, the readiness of EU citizens to speak and learn other languages plays a role as well. Both indicators go into an index of mutual understanding that is supposed to show the potential of the member states and their populations for social communication. Taken the wide angle of the concept as used by Deutsch, a third factor only indirectly linked to language command is included: the percentage of people who have socialized with people from another EU country within the last respective year (see table 4).

Table 4 reveals a small-country and an average effect. The last is connected to the different population sizes of EU member states. Eurobarometer findings for the whole of the European Union a based on the entirety of the population, and countries are not treated as standard units in calculating averages. The EU average in the mutual understanding index is therefore not located in the middle. People in small countries are more fluent in foreign languages than people from the big member states. Of them, Germans do read most in foreign languages, with a value of 25% for the last 12 months before 2005; all other big member states are around 20% ore even lower. In many of the small or medium size member states, averages of around 40% or more are regularly reading foreign language texts. The large number of big member state inhabitants pulls the EU average of reading command down to 23%, however.

The small-country effect refers to the index as a whole. The medium or big size member state ranking highest in the mutual understanding index is Poland on rank 12 with a mean value of 42. The index would be much lower even for Poland if indicator (c) would not refer to the proclamation of mastering foreign languages (in opposition to speaking them in reality). In general, in all big or medium size member states the number of people who think that at least two languages should be spoken is considerably higher than the actual number of speakers. Possibly, big member states residents therefore prefer others learning languages like German, Spanish, or English, rather than having in mind to learn Dutch, Portuguese or Slovenian themselves. The small-country effect is therefore not so much driven by the Indicator (c)

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[9] The information is from the Special Eurobarometer "Europeans and Languages", p. 3. See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_237.en.pdf.

- which is high in the bigger member states as well – but by the reading and socializing indicators (a) and (b). More than 50% of Luxemburgers, Maltese, Dutch, Estonians, Cypriote, Fins, Swedes, Germans, British, and Irish have enjoyed inner-European communication by reading or socializing. On the other hand, one of these two indicators is below 25% in Greece, Italy, Great Britain, Hungary, Spain, the Czech Republic, Ireland, France, and Portugal.

Table 4: Social communication and mutual understanding in the EU, 2005

	Percentage of people who have read a book, a newspaper or magazine in another language in last 12 months (a)	Opinion: Everyone in the EU should be able to speak at least two languages (b)	Percentage of people who have socialized with people from another EU country in last 12 months (c)	Index of mutual understanding ((a+b+c) / 3)
Luxemburg	91	53	84	76
Malta	*66*	*54*	*47*	*56*
Netherlands	51	33	74	53
Estonia	*40*	*62*	*50*	*51*
Cyprus	*30*	*68*	*57*	*52*
Denmark	49	48	49	49
Latvia	*44*	*64*	*40*	*49*
Belgium	36	60	47	48
Lithuania	*36*	*69*	*38*	*48*
Finland	40	40	58	46
Sweden	48	27	55	43
Poland	*19*	*75*	*32*	*42*
Greece	18	74	31	41
Austria	27	43	50	40
Germany	25	36	58	40
Italy	19	66	34	40
Slovenia	*35*	*47*	*39*	*40*
UK	17	48	54	40
Average EU	**23**	**50**	**43**	**39**
Slovakia	*27*	*47*	*30*	*35*
Hungary	*16*	*19*	*68*	*34*
Spain	15	24	63	34
Czech Republic	*20*	*33*	*45*	*33*
Ireland	13	53	34	33
France	22	39	31	31
Portugal	14	22	54	30

Sources: Special Eurobarometers 225, 237, and 243 (all 2005).[10]

The findings are connected to those parts of European integration theory which relate to decision-making and to the difference between big and small member states in

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[10] See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/.

particular. As we know, the reforms of the Nice Treaty and Eastern enlargement have shifted the balance within the decision-making system in favor of the big states with regard to their blocking power. Three big member states with any other partner are able to reach a blocking minority of 90 in the council of ministers of the EU-25. On the other hand, at least nine small member states are needed to form the same blockade (see Galloway 2001: 71). The imbalance is strengthened in some policy fields, e.g. in trade or foreign and security policy, when big member states possess more resources than the small ones and are ready to use them.

The underlying question in this area is about the readiness of elected and responsive national politicians to keep in mind consequences of European political decisions that take effect beyond their own national borders. If only about a quarter (or less) of the German, British, or French population are competent to follow cultural and political developments in foreign languages, and if the same number of Hungarians, Spaniards, and Portuguese regularly socialize with other Europeans, the horizon of common understanding is limited. However, the three big member states named within the EU decision-making system only have a limited incentive to turn their attention to foreign sensibilities. Other than Danish, Hungarian or Portuguese elites, they can exert power by not having "the ability to afford not to learn" (Deutsch 1966: 111). Of course, the tradition of EU decision-making does not show a systematic use of blocking potentials; rather the practice most commonly used consists in Council negotiations until all member states are satisfied (Mattila 2004). The endurance of this compromise culture is however not guaranteed for the future, and further politicization of the EU would push politicians from the big member states into an even stronger responsiveness towards their national constituencies rather than opening their trans-European horizons.

3.4. Practices of governing: governance cultures

Usually, in political science the dimensions of governance and culture are not located in the same area of research. The notion of governance is linked to non-hierarchical, partly steered and partly cooperative action in political processes rather than in structures (Rosenau/Czempiel 1992; Rosenau 2000; Benz 2004: 17). The culture of governance is then defined as the societal rooting of governance, e.g. the (historically grown) institutions and habits around governing activities by actors in a non-hierarchical environment (for the following, see Beichelt 2003; Beichelt 2004b). Governance culture hence applies to both political actors and the ruled who relate to each other in symbiotic ways.

As the other dimensions of culture discussed above, governance culture may be envisioned as a variable adding explanatory elements to integration theory which in itself does not stand as a monolithic bloc but is differentiated into different schools of thought and subject matters. Of the two, the concept of governance culture can fruitfully be linked to the arena of democratic governance. As is well known, the European Union is often attributed a democratic deficit, mainly with regard to the asymmetry of the governing and the ruled, the long chains of legitimacy not allowing for democratic control, the intransparency of the main political actors in Brussels,

and the lack of a people to constitute a space to be democratically governed (see Schmidt 2000, chapter 3.7). On the other hand, this democratic deficit can be interpreted as a "democratically legitimated democracy deficit" (ibid: 428) because the state of the Union's democracy has been authorized by democratic governments of the EU member states. Therefore, what counts for democracy in the EU is not only the quality of democracy on the EU level but also in the nation states. Since the nation states make up for fundaments of mitigating the EU democracy deficit, the characteristics of their own democracies play a determining role in EU democratization.

Now, all EU members should of course be rated as democracies; this is supported by pertinent research (Karatnycky 1997; Karatnycky/Motyl/Schnetzer 2001) as well as by the European Commission which had to watch for the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria prior to the entry of the new member states in 2004. Still, during the study of democratic transition after the fall of socialism several qualifications of the concept of democracy have appeared (Collier/Levitsky 1997). While there is no ideal democracy existing in reality anyways (Dahl 1989), notably the new democracies of Central Europe are usually expected to bear weaknesses in some dimensions of their regimes, for example with regard to democratic control mechanisms. These defects do not tangle their overall status as democracies; they are not seen as transition regimes any more.

An indicator of democratic governance culture then needs to enquire into those dimensions which make democracies defective without assaulting the core of democracy, which is sometimes called "minimal democracy" and refers to the accountability of the governing to the electorate (Schumpeter 1950; Downs 1957). Wolfgang Merkel has established such a model which distinguishes between horizontal and vertical control, political freedoms and exclusive power control as four arenas which may cause defects in democracies (Merkel u.a. 2003; Merkel 2004). The dimension of exclusive power control is not prevalent in Europe (except maybe in Turkey), where militaries or criminal structures do not seem to have enough power to decisively circumcise state authority. Merkel's three other dimensions are mirrored in the index of democratic governance culture (see below table 5):

- Corruption is an indicator for weak horizontal control mechanisms, when central or regional governments are not able to control the power of their administrations. An indicator to measure this phenomenon is the corruption perceptions index by the non-governmental organization Transparency International.[11]

- Freedom of speech is one among several dimensions relating to political freedoms. Since most democracy indicators, for example the one by Freedom House (2005), mainly aim at distinguishing democracies from non-

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[11] The corruption perception index (CPI) is measured in a scale from 0 to 10, based on the perception of the "extent of corruption" (Lambsdorff 2006: 2). A 10 stands for no corruption, the zero baseline is not explicitly defined but implicitly stands for a completely corrupt political and administrative regime. The CPI draws information from 16 different sources and uses non-parametric devices for standardization (ibid.).

democracies, they do not offer sufficient tools for differentiating between democracies. Therefore, another indicator is chosen: the importance attributed to the freedom of speech by the populations. The indicator is also suitable within the governance culture model because it relates to perceptions, not to a (allegedly) real indicator not marking the relationship between the governing and the governed.

- The satisfaction with democracy, finally, is linked to the horizontal control dimension. Again, a perception value is chosen, namely the percentage to which people in a country are satisfied with the way their own democracies work.

Table 5: Democratic governance culture in the EU

	CPI, Corruption perceptions index (a)	Importance of freedom of speech* (c)	Satisfaction with way democracy works in own country (d)	Index of democratic governance culture (((a x 10)+b+c) / 3)
Denmark	9.5	80	92	89.0
Luxemburg	8.5	81	82	82.7
Netherlands	8.6	84	71	80.3
Finland	9.6	68	77	80.3
Sweden	9.2	68	71	77.0
Austria	8.7	70	68	75.0
UK	8.6	75	60	73.7
Ireland	7.4	72	71	72.3
Belgium	7.4	71	65	70.0
Germany	8.2	74	53	69.7
Spain	7.0	69	67	68.7
France	7.5	71	53	66.3
Cyprus	*5.7*	*67*	*68*	*64.0*
Slovenia	*6.1*	*73*	*56*	*63.3*
Average EU	**6.7**	**68**	**53**	**62.7**
Greece	4.3	82	53	59.3
Malta	*6.6*	*57*	*48*	*57.0*
Portugal	6.5	52	41	52.7
Italy	5.0	62	44	52.0
Czech R.	*4.3*	*64*	*48*	*51.7*
Estonia	*6.4*	*46*	*44*	*51.3*
Latvia	*4.2*	*49*	*44*	*45.0*
Lithuania	*4.8*	*52*	*24*	*41.3*
Hungary	*5.0*	*42*	*27*	*39.7*
Slovakia	*4.3*	*49*	*26*	*39.3*
Poland	*3.4*	*51*	*29*	*38.0*

* Part of respondents which rate element as "very important", in %.

Sources: (a) Transparency International (2005), (b) Special Eurobarometer 225 (2005), (c) Eurobarometer 63 (2005), Q34a.

The index reveals considerable differences between old and new member states. Seven of the eight post-communist – all except Slovenia – states rank at the end of the table, with corruption perception indices between 6.4 (Estonia) and 3.4 (Poland), only around 50% of the populations deeming freedom of speech "very important", and less than 30% of the population satisfied with the way democracy works in Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. Some of the old member states – Greece and Italy – fall into the new member range with their CPIs of respectively 4.3 and 5.0. There is no old member state, however, where a minority evaluates freedom of speech very important, and only one (Portugal, 52%) comes close to that value. With regard to democracy satisfaction, a few old member states rank with other new member states like the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia, where between 44% and 48% are not satisfied with the state of their democracies – they are Portugal and Italy.

These results are little surprising for the approach of transition studies which sees "Leninist legacies" at work in post-communist Europe (Jowitt 1992; Crawford/Lijphart 1997). In this school, the heritage of socialism is among others seen in continuing mistrust in political institutions and enduring non-democratic habits. As can be seen with the deviating countries of the EU-15, a history of democratic transition may well be employed as an argument in the development of a democratic governance culture. Portugal and Greece underwent democratic transition in the 1970s and since have not been able to overcome persisting problems of corruption (Greece) and trust in some political freedoms and the functioning of the democratic regime (Portugal). On the other hand, a general authoritarian legacy hypothesis is not valid, as the cases of late democracy Spain and old democracy Italy show; Italy ranks low both on corruption and democracy satisfaction.

On the other end of the scale, a high performance on democratic governance culture can mainly be noted in countries with a limited time of EC/EU membership. From the founding states, only Luxemburg and the Netherlands show comparatively high values in all three dimensions of the index. France and Germany suffer mainly from a rather low satisfaction with democracy performance (53% both), but also their CPI remains lower than in all countries from Northern enlargement as well as Denmark and Great Britain from the first enlargement wave. Except for Austria and Luxemburg, large protestant minorities or mostly even majorities live in all countries with a high CPI rank; no old member country with a protestant majority disposes of a CPI lower than 8.6 (Great Britain).

What does the data tell us about European integration and its theory? The main finding – the large difference in democratic quality with regard to the governance culture in old and post-communist member states – hints into several directions. First, Eastern enlargement has contributed to the existing democracy deficit of the EU on the national level of multi-layer Europe. New member state governments are absorbed with fighting corruption and at the same time have to rely on publics largely dissatisfied with the ways their national democracies work. In fact, the obvious defects remind us of the fact that processes of democratic consolidation have lasted very long also in some West European states (Putnam 1993; Ginsborg 2001); Germany's path of a quick one-generation consolidation (Conradt 1980) is not a general rule.

Second, the new member states' task of continuing domestic democracy consolidation decreases the likeliness of sovereignty abdication, for example in the light of further integration steps. Since six of the eight post-communist EU member states are younger than 20 years, the process of regaining sovereignty is still ongoing in some areas. A main priority is sovereignty consolidation, not necessarily sovereignty dispersal. Where corruption and low levels of democracy support indicate low levels of effective political authority, ceding sovereignty to Brussels bears elements of elite capitulation. At the same time, political steps to encounter state weakness have to be directed to the national, not to the EU level. Since positive integration has been weak, the political resources to govern dispersed European political actors from Brussels or Strasburg are very limited. With regard to corruption, even the European Anti-Fraud Office OLAF itself doubts its "operational effectiveness" in an official document (see Neuhann 2004: 1). Therefore, enhancing the democratic quality of new member states governance cultures is functionally linked to strengthening the nation state, not to allowing its fusion into broader European structures.

Third, the growing interdependence of trans-European networks in various policy areas should determine an impact on the existing styles of governance. Since all states of the 2004 enlargement round are net-receivers from the EU budget both in regional policy (Beichelt 2004a: 170), national administrations stand in a strategic negotiating position between the two levels. On the one hand, they have to obey to the rules as established by Brussels; on the other hand they are backed by governments that have an incentive of overcoming democratic shortcomings by increasing the wealth conditions of their populations. Therefore, a new compromise culture between political and administrative actors could be in the making; in any case the resources of political command over administrative actors seem diminished. In that sense, eastern enlargement has also contributed to the quality of the EU as a governance regime at the expense of the governmental elements of the multi-level system.

4. Conclusion

Some historians have argued that the existence of many political, economic, and military centers has been one of the main preconditions to Europe's rise from the middle ages to the late 19th century (Kennedy 1987; Mitterauer 2003). The nation states which have evolved at the end of this long development still form the legal basis of today's European Union. Consequently, the cultural diversity that has evolved from centuries of economic competition, military conflict and social communication is enduring. Both "Europe" and European "cultures" are constructed by highly diverse narratives that relate to each other in complex ways. European integration may have succeeded in supranationalizing some, mostly technical, policy areas and created European governance networks that exist in addition to the member states and their legitimation systems. It would be (too) far fetched, however, to see European integration as a homogeneous process within rectified European value systems or identities (Wagner 2005).

The task of linking the one area to the other with explanatory operations therefore bears problematic elements from the beginning. First, neither culture nor European integration constitute homogeneous variables; some culturalist theorists would even argue that depicting culture as a variable generally leads to the wrong track (see section 2). Second, the theory of European integration these insights are supposed to add to falls into different fields. As has been mentioned above, Rosamond has identified four different "locations" of integration theory (Rosamond 2000). Other authors suggest different distinctions, for example Wiener and Diez (2004) with regard to the underlying operations of "explaining", "analyzing", and "constructing". In any case, the axiomatic character of the existing differentiations shows that not only the analyzed variables, but also the embedding theories bear a highly diverse character.

In the given text, I have not tried to either homogenize these theories or to single out one theoretic location, operation, or school of thought. Rather, I have concentrated on arenas which are undisputedly cultural: identity, religion, lingual communication, and historically grown practices of governing. I have tried to measure these cultural elements by constructing indices that show cultural variance within the EU-25. These have then been related to those elements of European integration theories in which the dependent variable shows an inherent response to the variance of the independent variable. While the results are not systematic whatsoever, they still bear some insights on the potential role of culture on European integration:

1. In contradiction to common wisdom, small European member states do not have a tendency of substituting their national identities with a European one. With Great Britain building an exception, only small or very small countries show a small European identification index, which hints at comparatively equal distributions of territorial self-attribution to Europe and the nation state. In consequence, an automatic drive of small member states to search for a European shield and hence to a deepening of European integration constitutes a myth. Rather, further steps of European integration will have to respect the subsidiarity principle which leaves notably the small member states enough margins for their identification patterns.

2. The varying spiritual affinity of the European peoples affects the extent to which their political leaderships opt for negative, e.g. market-building, or positive, e.g. institution-building, integration. A population bias towards the here and now apparently works against political projects of creating new market-correcting institutions that (have to) rely on communities rather than individuals and on final European reasons rather than on existing points of reference.

3. The relative lingual ignorance of the populations of big and medium size member states makes them less open for sensibilities in other member states, notably in small or even very small ones. With the increased complexity of decision-making in the enlarged EU, the incentives of big member states axes for ad-hoc cooperation should be growing, and at the same time smaller member states have to voice their marginal concerns ever louder in order to be heard. New member states are in a particularly bad position because their

traditional concerns are not well known the publics of Western Europe, and their net-receiver status leaves them in a defensive position anyway.

4. The more defective the governance cultures of a member state, the stronger the drive of domestic politicians to consolidate administrations, judiciary systems and other subsystems in national terms. Therefore, notably the governance cultures of the new member states – where sovereignty recovery is an issue in itself – in tendency work against further integration steps as long as the political elites are kept busy consolidating the legitimacy and accountability in the domestic arena.

Taken together then, the new member states do not add to the cultural diversity of the EU *per se*. With regard to identities, spiritual orientations and language command, their diversity is easily mirrored by the diversity of the old EU-15. In particular, mechanisms that are concentrated against further steps of integration, e.g. the inclusion of further policy areas or the institutional deepening of existing ones, are not culminating in the new member states. If there is a group of countries with culture related variables contributing to skepticism towards a further deepening of the EU, it is the mostly protestant, geographically distant, small, and economically relatively well-off group of Northern countries which joined the EC/EU in different enlargement waves (UK/Denmark, Sweden/Finland, Estonia/Latvia). This finding, however, relates to the first two discussed indices only – the European identification index and the index of spiritual belief. The governance culture index is to a large extent determined by the age of a democracy and therefore tells different things about old democracies like Denmark or Sweden than about Latvia or Slovakia. And, the theoretic argument around the social communication index in the end refers to big member states only.

Indeed, what makes the new member states most different from the older EU members is the time span during which their people have enjoyed democracy. We know from former waves of democratization that democratic governance styles only develop in long time horizons. On the one hand, this knowledge should refrain us from allowing too many normative elements into the discourse of European integration. On the other, we have to be aware that the character of European integration will be changing. European integration theory has only started to take these factors into account, and it should continue taking cultural elements or variables into consideration.

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